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gMonopoly: Does Search Bias Warrant Antitrust or 
Regulatory Intervention? 
ANDREW LANGFORD∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet continues to grow explosively. In December 2008, the Internet had 
one billion users.1 By June 2012, that number had reached 2.4 billion, or roughly a 
third of the earth’s population.2 As early as 2002, our refrigerators and microwaves 
began using the Internet.3 
Without search engines, the Internet’s explosive growth would not be possible. 
Users would only be able to visit websites by knowing the website’s URL or by 
clicking a link from another website.4 In essence, the Internet would be like a planet 
where nobody had a map.5 Search engines like Bing, Google, and Yahoo! provide 
that map. 
As the cartographers of the Internet, search engines wield great power. 6 And, as 
search engines have expanded their product offerings beyond the traditional “ten 
blue links” search,7 competitors have begun to allege that search engines are 
abusing their power. While the allegations of anticompetitive conduct are legion,8 
this Note is concerned with only one: search bias. Search bias, as the term is used 
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 1. Dawn Kawamoto, Internet Users Worldwide Surpass 1 Billion, CNET NEWS (Jan. 23, 
2009, 4:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10149534-93.html. 
 2. World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (2012), 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
 3. See LG Internet Refrigerator Is at the Heart of the Digital Home Network, 
BESTSTUFF (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.beststuff.com/lg-internet-refrigerator-is-at-the-heart-
of-the-digital-home-network/. 
 4. See Thad Collins, Searching the Internet Without Search Engines, 
STREETDIRECTORY, http://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/2317/computers_and_the_
internet/searching_the_internet_without_search_engines.html. 
 5. Google Chairman Eric Schmidt has likened search engines to a GPS for the internet. See 
Hayley Tsukayama, Google’s Eric Schmidt Defends the Company’s Search Practices, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept 21, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
tech/post/googles-eric-schmidt-defends-the-companys-search-practices/2011/09/21/gIQAR
7AllK_blog.html. 
 6. Some even say if you are not on Google’s search results, you might as well not 
exist. See Rick Mans, If You Are Not in Google, You Don’t Exist, DON’T MIND RICK (Jan. 29, 
2010), http://dontmindrick.com/opinion/you-not-in-google-dont-exist. 
 7. “Ten blue links” refers to the classic Google search results page. In its original 
incarnation, Google merely returned a list of ten blue links, whereas today various images 
and decoration may appear surrounding the search results. Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, 
Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias: Search “Neutrality” and Other 
Proposals, J. INTERNET L., May 2012, at 1, 10. 
 8. Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, European Comm’n for 
Competition Policy, Statement of VP Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation (May 
21, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-372_en.htm?locale
=en (reciting four areas of “concern” in the European Commission’s antitrust investigation). 
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in this Note, occurs when a search engine changes its search rankings for some 
illicit purpose, such as inhibiting the ability of consumers to find competitors’ 
websites.9 Several parties have proposed that alleged search bias by Google may 
constitute an antitrust violation due to Google’s dominance in search.10 These 
accusations were scrutinized in a large scale investigation by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) that ended in early 2013 when the FTC concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to bring an enforcement action against Google.11 But the 
FTC has indicated that its investigation may reopen in the future if further evidence 
comes to light, and that Google’s leadership in the search engine industry will 
render it a continuing target of regulatory scrutiny.12 The FTC’s European Union 
counterpart is also still conducting its own investigation.13 In addition to 
governmental investigations, a growing body of legal scholarship is now analyzing 
the myriad issues raised by attempting to remedy search bias.14 
Though search engines wield substantial power, the nature of the Internet makes 
evaluating antitrust claims against search engines vexing. The role of search 
engines as key Internet intermediaries tempts one to analogize search engines to 
industries that have traditionally been the subject of antitrust scrutiny and 
government regulation, such as telecommunications providers, railroads, and 
electric utilities.15 Seizing on these similarities and on perceived barriers to entry, 
some commentators have argued for a regulation of search.16 However, these 
analogies are not so cut and dry in a market where users can switch products at zero 
cost and new entrants cannot be excluded from competition. 
This Note explores the antitrust implications, under § 2 of the Sherman Act,17 of 
a dominant search engine manipulating its search results to gain a competitive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. This Note’s use of the term “search bias” thus does not include any manipulation of 
search engine results. Rather, this Note uses the term in the sense of bias premised on some 
anticompetitive purpose. 
 10. See Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launches-formal-investigation/foundem-google-story; 
Juan Carlos Perez, FairSearch.org Urges AGs to Tackle Google Over Antitrust, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 11, 2011 2:23 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9220730/FairSearch.org_urges_AGs_to_tackle_Google_over_antitrust. 
 11. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, 
Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter FTC Google Statement], 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. See, e.g., Carol Matlack & Stephanie Bodoni, Google’s EU Antitrust Proposal Will 
Likely Be Tweaked, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.business
week.com/articles/2013-04-15/googles-eu-antitrust-proposal-will-likely-see-tweaks. 
 14. See infra Part III (discussing various proposals and arguments for regulating search 
bias). 
 15. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475 
(2009) (tracing the debate over search engine regulation). 
 16. See generally id. 
 17.  
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
2013] gMONOPOLY 1561 
 
advantage in other markets. Google, which now offers a number of its own 
nonsearch services and is currently considered by many to wield monopoly power 
in search, will be used as an exemplar. 
Part I of this Note explains how search engines work and how they finance 
themselves, and it also describes the various products that search engines are now 
offering beyond traditional search. These additional products provide search 
engines with a financial incentive to manipulate search results for the benefit of 
their own products and to the detriment of competitors. Search bias is thus likely to 
be a continuing object of regulatory and antitrust scrutiny. 
Part II will discuss a hypothetical § 2 monopolization claim against Google 
premised on search result bias. An analysis of Google’s business requires resolving 
difficult antitrust problems. Among them are how to analyze multisided markets 
and whether antitrust law can impose liability based on services that are offered for 
free. This Note concludes that antitrust enforcement premised on search bias is not 
supported by precedent, and that any antitrust remedy would be problematic. Part 
III will analyze various grounds and proposals for regulating search bias, and will 
make its own proposal. 
I. SEARCH ENGINES—HOW THEY WORK, HOW THEY ARE FINANCED, AND HOW 
THEY ARE EXPANDING 
An introduction to the inner workings and business models of search engines is 
necessary to understand the antitrust issues that search bias presents. As such, this 
Part will provide the necessary material to understand the world of search. 
A. How Search Engines Work 
A search engine must perform two basic tasks: (1) the search engine must map 
the content available on the Internet and (2) in response to a user’s search terms, the 
search engine must employ an algorithm to provide a list of the most relevant 
“organic” search results.18 
A search engine discovers content on the Internet using programs called 
“crawlers.”19 A crawler begins with a list of “seed” URLs.20 The crawler will 
examine the web pages attached to the seed URLs and record any links contained 
on these pages.21 The crawler will then visit the links it has recorded and repeat the 
                                                                                                                 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or 
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court. 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 18. “Organic” refers to the search results that an algorithm will produce without 
tampering. See, e.g., Parts Geek, LLC v. U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc., No. 09-5578, 2010 
WL 1381005, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2010). 
 19. MARK LEVENE, AN INTRODUCTION TO SEARCH ENGINES AND WEB NAVIGATION 82 
(2d ed. 2010). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 82−83. 
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crawling process.22 This is a never-ending cycle that allows new content on the 
Internet to be continuously discovered and made available in search results.23 
As the crawler explores pages, the content of those pages is copied and 
“indexed.”24 The search engine’s index must then be evaluated for relevancy by the 
search engine’s algorithm in response to queries.25 The algorithm is what 
differentiates a good search engine from a bad one.26 
Google’s PageRank algorithm was pioneering. Rather than simply looking to the 
number of times a term appears on a page, as earlier search algorithms had done, 
PageRank places the heaviest weighting on the number of times other websites link 
to a page.27 Today, the PageRank algorithm employs over two hundred factors.28 
PageRank received roughly 550 tweaks in 2010 and the process of perfecting it is 
ongoing.29 
Highlighting the economic importance of search engines, a search engine 
optimization (SEO) cottage industry has risen up around Google, with consultants 
purporting to be able to manipulate Google’s ranking system.30 Google plays a 
constant cat-and-mouse game with the SEO industry, and the company is known to 
penalize websites that try to cheat the system by banishing them to the back pages 
of the search results.31 
B. How Search Engines Are Financed 
Most search engines, like radio and television broadcasters, provide free 
services that are financed by advertising revenues.32 This advertising usually comes 
in the form of paid advertisements that appear separate from organic search 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 81. 
 25. Steven Levy, Exclusive: How Google’s Algorithm Rules the Web, WIRED MAGAZINE 
(Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/
all/1. 
 26. See LEVENE, supra note 19, at 80 (describing the algorithm as the “heart of the 
search engine”). 
 27. Levy, supra note 25. The original PageRank algorithm is the subject of a patent that 
expires in 2017. U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998). The patent is assigned to 
Stanford University, which granted Google an exclusive license to the patent. Lisa M. 
Krieger, Stanford Earns $336 Million Off Google Stock, REDORBIT (Dec. 1, 2005), http://
www.redorbit.com/news/education/318480/stanford_earns_336_million_off_google_stock. 
 28. Levy, supra note 25. For example, depending on what is being searched for, 
PageRank may rank new pages as more relevant than older pages, as in the case of breaking 
news stories. See id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13search.html (outlining instances of “black 
hat” SEO). 
 31. For example, Google demoted J.C. Penney’s search results after the search engine 
determined that J.C. Penney had tried to manipulate the system in violation of Google’s SEO 
policies. Id. 
 32. See generally James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Online Advertising: Defining 
Relevant Markets, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 653 (2010). 
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results.33 Just as with search results, Google has implemented an innovative 
strategy called AdWords, originally pioneered by a company called Overture, that 
has catapulted it to the top of the heap.34 
AdWords is an auction-based system for search results advertising that allows 
advertisers to bid on keywords.35 So, an advertiser who bids on the word 
“computer” is bidding to have his advertisement displayed when a user performs a 
search involving the term “computer.”36 Thus, in the auction process, very common 
words will receive higher bids and more obscure search terms will receive lower 
bids.37 Because the auction process is triggered by the search terms a user enters, an 
auction takes place in real time whenever a user googles something.38 
Simply placing the highest bid, however, does not ensure that a bidder’s 
advertisement will appear on Google’s sponsored links. To compute whose ads will 
be displayed, Google also utilizes “Quality Scores.”39 Quality Scores are calculated 
using criteria similar to PageRank. A number of factors go into a Quality Score, 
including the relevance of the ad to the search terms, the quality of the page that the 
ad links to, the percentage of times users click on the ad when it appears, and many 
other factors that Google keeps secret.40 This means that a website with relevant, 
high quality content will appear as an advertisement on Google more cheaply than 
an advertiser with lower quality results. The system allows Google to exercise 
some automated quality control over the ads it displays, and Google believes the 
process is more profitable than a highest-bidder-take-all system.41 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See Commercial Alert Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of 
Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (June 
27, 2002) [hereinafter Commercial Alert Letter], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/
staff/commercialalertletter.shtm. 
 34. Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability, 
WIRED MAGAZINE (May 22, 2009), http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/
17-06/nep_googlenomics. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id.; see also Larry Kim, The Most Expensive Keywords in Google AdWords, 
WORDSTREAM (July 18, 2011), http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2011/07/18/most-
expensive-google-adwords-keywords (listing the top twenty most expensive keywords). 
 37. This is known as the “Keyword Pricing Index.” See Levy, supra note 34. Words like 
“flowers” and “hotels” are coveted search terms and so are almost always bid up to high 
prices. Id. Some terms will vary in value seasonally, like “snowboarding.” Id. “Long tails” 
are obscure terms that will almost always be available at a low auction price, which provides 
niche businesses with the ability to competitively bid for highly specialized terms. See id. 
 38. See id. That means that 13.4 billion AdWords auctions were performed in October 
2011, or about 5000 per second. See Press Release, comScore, comScore Releases October 
2011 U.S. Search Engine Rankings (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.comscore.com/
Insights/Press_Releases/2011/11/comScore_Releases_October_2011_U.S._Search_Engine_
Rankings (reporting that in October 2011 Google received 13.4 billion search requests). 
 39. Levy, supra note 34. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. Google has expanded on the success of its AdWords program with AdSense. 
See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 194 (2011). AdSense 
customers place Google’s sponsored link advertising on their websites instead of using 
traditional banner advertising. See id. In essence, AdSense places Google’s advertising 
program on participating websites—the ads are still dynamic and depend on the content of 
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Google had revenues of $23.6 billion in 2009, 99% of which was advertising 
revenue.42 In the first quarter of 2010, 66% of Google’s revenue came from 
advertising on Google websites, 30% from advertising on Google network 
websites,43 and the remaining 4% came from “other revenues.”44 
C. How Search Engines Are Expanding 
In the search industry, search engines can be conceptually divided between 
“horizontal” search and “vertical” search.45 Horizontal search engines provide 
search results that encompass the entire spectrum of Internet material—they are 
designed so that one can search for anything.46 Vertical search engines, by contrast, 
are specialized search engines designed to provide search results that are tailored to 
a particular area.47 For example, Nextag is a vertical search engine that provides 
price comparisons for various products.48 Google is a horizontal search engine. 
When users type a product name into Google’s horizontal search product, unlike in 
Nextag, they may get a variety of search results. For example, users might see 
product reviews, the manufacturer’s website, or retailers offering the product for 
sale. Google also formerly offered Google Product Search, a price comparison 
website that competed with Nextag.49 In mid-2012, Google Product Search was 
replaced with Google Shopping.50 Google Shopping is the first search service 
offered by Google that requires merchants to pay as a condition of being listed in 
the search results—a practice known as “paid inclusion.”51 When this Note was 
originally drafted, Google Shopping had yet to be announced. That illustrates how 
quickly the search industry evolves. 
In 2007, Google introduced Universal Search,52 a system that is likely to be 
central to some of the antitrust claims against Google. Universal Search evaluates 
the user’s search terms and attempts to determine exactly what type of answer the 
                                                                                                                 
the website they appear on, just like the ads that appear on Google’s own website. See id. 
 42. Jim Edwards, Google’s Revenue Breakdown Shows It Controls Even More 
Advertising Than You’d Think, CBS NEWS (May 25, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-505123_162-42744932/googles-revenue-breakdown-shows-it-controls-even-more
-advertising-than-youd-think. 
 43. Google network websites are websites that participate in AdSense. See The Google 
Network, GOOGLE, http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=
6104. 
 44. Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 26 (May 5, 2010). 
 45. See Danny Sullivan, Google Launches “Universal Search” & Blended Results, 
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 16, 2007, 2:33 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-20-
google-universal-search-11232. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See About Nextag, NEXTAG, http://www.nextag.com/about/main. 
 49. What Is Google Product Search?, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/checkout/sell/
bin/answer.py?hl=en-GB&answer=64947. 
 50. Danny Sullivan, Google Product Search to Become Google Shopping, Use Pay-to-
Play Model, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 31, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://searchengineland.com/
google-product-search-to-become-google-shopping-use-pay-to-play-model-122959. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Sullivan, supra note 45. 
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user is searching for.53 For example, if a user types in a street address, Google may 
determine that the user is searching for directions to that location.54 Google then 
displays a link to its own map service, Google Maps, often at a high position in the 
search results.55 The Google Maps result is also set off from the other results with 
larger text and a picture of a map, while the rest of the search results appear as 
normal blue links.56 Clicking on the link will take the user to the Google Maps 
page, where more Google ads appear.57 Bing and Yahoo! (which is powered by 
Bing’s technology) have similar functionality.58 
II. A HYPOTHETICAL § 2 CLAIM AGAINST GOOGLE 
This Part details the story of a real-life allegation of anticompetitive conduct 
against Google and applies a § 2 analysis to it. For the purposes of the analysis, it 
will be assumed that all conduct by Google is unilateral. That is, there is no 
agreement or conspiracy between Google and another party to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct. This limits the discussion to § 2 claims.59 The following 
analysis attempts to maintain an objective viewpoint and it is not conclusive—
many issues involve facts that are unavailable, and the resolution of many legal 
issues is unclear. 
Foundem is a price comparison website operated out of the United Kingdom, 
and the organization has become a noisy public critic of Google.60 The company is 
one of nine that have filed formal complaints against Google in the European 
Commission’s ongoing antitrust investigation.61 Foundem also filed comments with 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) encouraging the agency to 
include search engines in the net neutrality regulatory agenda.62 
Foundem’s beef with Google dates back several years and is recounted on the 
organization’s activist website, Searchneutrality.org, created by Foundem to raise 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. See id. 
 54. See INSIDE GOOGLE, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, TRAFFIC REPORT: HOW GOOGLE IS 
SQUEEZING OUT COMPETITORS AND MUSCLING INTO NEW MARKETS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/TrafficStudy-Google.pdf. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Sullivan, supra note 45. 
 58. See generally JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, INT’L CTR. FOR LAW & ECON., DEFINING AND 
MEASURING SEARCH BIAS: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE (2011), available at 
http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/definingmeasuring.pdf (finding that Bing and 
Yahoo! both exhibit greater search bias than Google). 
 59. “Independent actions taken by an entity fall outside the purview of § 1.” Virgin Atl. 
Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 60. See Rob D. Young, Report: Google EU Antitrust Expands, Up to 9 Complainants, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 3, 2011), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2098919/
Report-Google-EU-Antitrust-Expands-Up-to-9-Complainants. 
 61. Id. 
 62. ADAM RAFF & SHIVAUN RAFF, REPLY COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COMMISSION’S PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2012) 
available at http://www.foundem.co.uk/FCC_Comments.pdf. Search neutrality was not 
included in the FCC’s controversial net neutrality rules. See FCC Rep. 10-201 (Dec. 21, 
2010). 
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public awareness and to advocate for regulation of Google.63 In June 2006, Google 
severely reduced Foundem’s PageRank and Quality Score.64 As a result of the 
demotion, Foundem needed to bid one hundred times more to achieve the same 
AdWords placement, and Foundem dropped several pages down in the search 
results.65 After petitioning Google for several years, Google informed Foundem 
that a change to its algorithm had caused the demotion. Google then manually 
“whitelisted” Foundem from its AdWords penalty in 2007, and later restored its 
PageRank in 2009.66 During that time Foundem’s rankings remained steady on both 
Yahoo! and Bing.67 Foundem states that during the demotion, an exemplary query 
resulted in Foundem ranking first on Yahoo!, seventh on Bing, and 144th on 
Google.68 Following the whitelisting, the same search terms that had placed 
Foundem 144th on Google now placed it in the fifth position.69 Foundem states that 
its organic traffic from Google (i.e., traffic that did not come from advertising on 
Google) jumped by roughly 10,000% “overnight” after the PageRank 
whitelisting.70 
Foundem alleges that during its demotion (and after), Google took steps to boost 
the success of its own price comparison service, Google Product Search, by 
inflating its position in the search results and by making Google Product Search 
listings appear more conspicuous than other listings.71 For the purposes of the 
antitrust analysis, the assumed facts are that Google demoted one or more 
competitors’ rankings on its search engine, while simultaneously boosting its own 
competing product’s search rankings, for the purpose of gaining a competitive 
advantage.72 As will be seen below, virtually every aspect of an antitrust claim 
against a dominant search engine would be problematic for a plaintiff, and the issue 
of anticompetitive conduct is likely dispositive. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations.”73 This establishes three offenses: monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize.74 Only monopolization and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See About, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.searchneutrality.
org/about. 
 64. See Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 10. 
 65. Id. Recall that Google ranks AdWords bidders by both the amount of their bids and 
the quality of their website (their Quality Score). Because Foundem’s Quality Score was 
lowered, Foundem had to bid higher than before to compensate. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. In other words, like a court ruling on a motion to dismiss, Foundem’s allegations 
will be taken as true. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 5 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ, COMPETITION AND 
MONOPOLY], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. 
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attempted monopolization will be considered in this Note. A monopolization claim 
will be evaluated, followed by a brief discussion of attempted monopolization. 
Monopolization “has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in [a] 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”75 To determine whether monopoly power 
exists, courts begin by evaluating the firm’s market share, which in turn requires 
that the court define a relevant market.76 
A. Relevant Markets 
A relevant market “is composed of products that have reasonable 
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and 
qualities considered.”77 In addition, the market must be limited in geographic 
scope.78 Once the relevant market is defined, the court can then examine whether 
monopoly power exists and whether it has been abused. 
While parties such as Foundem do not compete directly with Google’s search 
engine, and are instead downstream competitors, the likely claims of 
anticompetitive conduct by entities like Foundem require Google’s general search 
product to have a monopolistic share of a relevant market. Accordingly, this 
analysis discusses how a court might characterize the markets for horizontal search 
and search advertising, and foregoes a discussion of any downstream markets. 
There has been considerable debate on how to define the relevant markets for 
Internet-based companies,79 and the hypothetical case against Google also 
implicates the broader discussion of how to assess relevant markets where a market 
is multisided. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570−71 (1966). 
 76. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965) (“Without a definition of [the] market there is no way to measure [the] ability to 
lessen or destroy competition.”). 
 77. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). In Du 
Pont, the Supreme Court determined that the relevant market for du Pont, producer of 70% 
of cellophane in the United States, was “flexible packaging material[s]” because cellophane 
was economically interchangeable with such products. Id. at 400. Du Pont’s analysis has 
been criticized as the “Cellophane Fallacy” because, according to many commentators, du 
Pont had already raised its prices to profit-maximizing monopoly levels. See DOJ, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 26. Under this view, the only reason that 
any interchangeable products for cellophane existed was that du Pont had raised its prices to 
the point that consumers would consider substitutes. Id. at 26−27. Thus, the Supreme Court 
inferred there was no monopoly power, when in fact there likely was, by defining the 
relevant market too broadly. Id. 
 78. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 395. 
 79. See, e.g., Bruce Abramson, Are “Online Markets” Real and Relevant? From the 
Monster-HotJobs Merger to the Google-DoubleClick Merger, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
655 (2008); Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 32. 
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1. Horizontal Search 
The most obvious relevant market is, of course, horizontal search, defined 
above.80 However, the scope of the relevant market for search engines is vigorously 
debated, and Google itself has argued the market is so broad that it encompasses 
virtually any means of searching for information.81 As the relevant market 
definition is a question of fact that requires significant empirical research, this Part 
will instead focus on certain novel antitrust issues implicated by search engine 
business models. 
One wrinkle in the relevant market analysis is that search engine services are 
offered for free to users. In KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., a district court 
ruled that horizontal search cannot be a relevant market because consumers do not 
pay for it.82 This calls into question the antitrust analysis applicable to a multisided 
market, an issue that is overlooked by the court’s opinion. 
In a classic two-sided market an intermediary connects two distinct groups who 
benefit one another via indirect network effects; that is, the value of a product to 
Group A rises as more members of Group B use it, and vice versa.83 Credit cards 
are one example.84 The credit card company acts as an intermediary, connecting 
cardholders with merchants.85 Cardholders want cards that are accepted by most 
merchants, and merchants want cards that customers expect them to accept.86 Thus, 
there is a feedback loop between the parties. However, if the network effects are 
well established, they may allow the intermediary to engage in monopolistic 
practices because one side of the market will not respond to price increases on the 
other side of the market.87 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. 
 81. See John McDonnell, Eric Schmidt Admits Apple’s Siri May Pose ‘Competitive 
Threat’ to Google, METRO (Nov. 7, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://metro.co.uk/2011/11/07/eric-
schmidt-admits-apples-siri-may-pose-competitive-threat-to-google-211676. 
 82. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“KinderStart cites no authority indicating that antitrust law 
concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services. Providing search 
functionality may lead to revenue from other sources, but KinderStart has not alleged that 
anyone pays Google to search. Thus, the Search Market is not a ‘market’ for purposes of 
antitrust law.”). 
 83. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets 1–2 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Stud., Working Paper No. 02-13, 2002), available at 
http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/04/phpMt.pdf. Evans discusses 
an amusing case study of two-sided markets: Japanese dating clubs. Id. at 1. The clubs match 
men and women by placing them on opposite sides of glass in a room. Id. Men then send women 
missives via the wait staff to indicate their interest. Id. The two sides of the market in Japanese 
dating clubs are men and women, but there is a mismatch in demand—far more men want to go 
to the clubs than women. Id. To balance out the sexes, clubs often charge the men large 
membership and entry fees, while women either enter for free or are paid to do so. Id. 
 84. Id. at 3. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST: 
THEORY AND CASE STUDIES 463–64 (2012). 
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According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), this would have occurred in the 
proposed merger between First Data Corp. and Concord EFS, Inc., two of the 
largest PIN debit network operators in the United States.88 After recognizing that 
the “‘PIN debit market is two-sided in nature,’”89 the DOJ concluded that the 
merged PIN networks could profitably hold up merchants for monopoly rents due 
to merchants’ dependence on the network of cardholders.90 The DOJ found that a 
rise in merchant fees would not appreciably affect cardholder demand because 
cardholders would not perceive the increased costs.91 Hence, the cardholder side of 
the market would not discipline the intermediary’s behavior on the merchant side. 92 
As with debit card providers, feedback effects have probably become a one-way 
street for Google. But the feedback effects may be slightly different. While 
advertisers care about the number of consumers that visit Google, consumers likely 
do not care about the number of advertisers or the cost of advertisements (unless 
perhaps the number of advertisements becomes so onerous that the search engine 
interface suffers).93 Instead, the primary concern of users is probably the quality of 
Google’s search product. Accordingly, the feedback effect arises from the pressure 
users place on Google to maintain the quality of its search product. Google must 
respond to this pressure so that it can maintain a healthy, paying audience of 
advertisers. However, the cases have yet to directly confront these issues in a 
nuanced way. 
For example, in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., a district 
court found that the market for Internet Yellow Pages was a relevant market 
because the services, although free to consumers, had commercial value from 
advertising revenues.94 That Internet Yellow Pages providers might be competing 
with other forms of advertising did not seem to factor into the court’s analysis in 
GTE. That oversight is troubling because it is not apparent that a single dominant 
provider could charge higher advertising prices if other advertising venues compete 
for the same business.95 Such an inquiry would be key to reaching a correct 
decision in an antitrust case. In another recent decision, a Chinese court concluded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Id. at 461–63. 
 89. Id. at 463. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 208 (“Typical ‘feedback effects’ seen in 
many multisided platforms are attenuated or absent in Google’s business because the effects 
are generally unidirectional: advertisers want more end users, but end users care little or 
nothing about the number of advertisers.”). 
 94. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 42 (D.D.C. 
1998); see also LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV06-6994AHM(RZx), 2007 WL 
6865852, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (finding that “Internet-based social networking 
websites” was a relevant market). The court used search engines as an example of an ad-
supported business that depends on a large number of consumers utilizing free services. 
GTE, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 39; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87, 
at 464 (discussing GTE). 
 95. See GTE, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (“[A]dvertising revenue in the Internet Yellow Pages 
market substantially depends on the number of users accessing a particular website because 
Internet advertisers are willing to pay higher advertisement rates on websites with a higher 
volume of user traffic.”). 
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that horizontal search is a relevant market because “[t]he free search service 
provided by search engine providers to internet users is not equivalent to a free 
service for charity, and may obtain actual or potential commercial benefits by 
attracting internet users and employing advertisements or other marketing 
services.”96 
The law is unsettled on whether a free service can be a relevant market, and case 
law has yet to grapple squarely with current thinking on two-sided markets. 
However, the above authorities illustrate that courts and agencies are willing to find 
a relevant market where a free service is supported by advertising revenues, or 
where subsidizing one side of the market still allows the intermediary to profitably 
charge supra-competitive rents on the other side. 
2. Search Engine Advertising 
There is a debate over whether this market should be limited to search engine 
advertising (i.e., advertisements that appear on search engines), or expanded to 
include all forms of web-based advertising, or even to include traditional 
advertising media.97 Unlike the market for horizontal search, courts and agencies 
have already weighed in on the relevant market for search engine advertising. One 
district court concluded that the market should be defined as all Internet-based 
advertising.98 On the other hand, the DOJ has concluded that “Internet search 
advertising” and “Internet search syndication” are separate relevant markets.99 
For its part, the FTC has concluded that “all online advertising does not 
constitute a relevant antitrust market.”100 The FTC analyzed three separate markets: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. R. Ian McEwin & Corinne Chew, China—The Baidu Decision, 6 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 223, 227 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The case involved 
allegations that the Chinese search engine Baidu abused its market position by tying the 
plaintiff’s search rankings to its continued participation in Baidu’s “Pay for Placement” 
program. Id. at 225–26. The court ruled against the plaintiffs because they had failed to 
prove that Baidu had a dominant share of search in China. Id. at 230. 
 97. See generally Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 32 (evaluating competition between 
various types of advertising media). 
 98. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“[T]here is no logical basis for distinguishing the Search Ad 
Market from the larger market for Internet advertising. Because a website may choose to 
advertise via search-based advertising or by posting advertisements independently of any 
search, search-based advertising is reasonably interchangeable with other forms of Internet 
advertising. The Search Ad Market thus is too narrow to constitute a relevant market.”). 
 99. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. 
Abandon Their Advertising Agreement (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-981.html. “Internet search advertising” refers to advertisements 
that appear on search engines themselves, whereas “internet search syndication” refers to 
advertisements that appear on third-party websites through services like Google’s AdSense 
program. See id. The DOJ reached its conclusion after evaluating a proposed partnership 
between Yahoo! and Google; the parties abandoned the deal after the DOJ announced its 
intention to file an antitrust lawsuit to block the agreement. Id. 
 100. Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, 7 (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf. The FTC’s analysis arose in the context of Google’s 
proposed merger with DoubleClick, a leader in direct buy advertising. Id. at 2. In essence, the 
issue was whether the merger of DoubleClick’s direct purchase advertising business with 
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“search advertising, ads sold through intermediaries, and directly sold ad 
inventory.”101 Focusing primarily on the latter two categories, the FTC concluded 
that ads sold through intermediaries (e.g., AdSense) are a separate and distinct 
market from directly sold ad inventory (e.g., banner advertisements).102 
Intermediary ads tend to be purchased with the intention of causing consumers to 
make a purchase on the spot, whereas directly purchased ads are bought for the 
purpose of improving brand recognition.103 This distinction, along with evidence 
that advertisers did not view the two types of ads as substitutes, led the FTC to 
conclude they constitute separate markets.104 The FTC also concluded that 
“contextually targeted ads do not constitute a separate market; rather they are part 
of a broad market that includes all ads sold by intermediaries” because “the 
evidence show[ed] that the prices and quality of contextual ads are constrained by 
other forms of display ads sold by ad intermediaries (and vice versa).”105 
That a district court, the DOJ, and the FTC all reached very different 
conclusions about the relevant market indicates that there is substantial room for 
debate about the scope of the market for search advertising. The district court said 
all online advertising is included; the DOJ said search engine advertising is its own 
market; and the FTC agreed with the DOJ that search engine advertising is its own 
market, although the FTC broke with the DOJ when it concluded that Internet 
search syndication is part of the larger market for online intermediary 
advertisements. 
Whether search advertising is its own relevant market is another question for 
further empirical research. This Note is directed toward search bias, and therefore 
claims directed solely against Google’s alleged search advertising monopoly are 
not at issue. What is key is that the DOJ and FTC have concluded that search 
advertising is a relevant market and that Google is a dominant player, which 
suggests courts will be more likely to find market power in the related market for 
horizontal search because of the multi-sided nature of the market.106 
Other market definitions will likely be important in any sort of antitrust claim 
against Google, but it is impossible to hypothesize all the conceivable markets on 
the Internet or those that may spring up overnight. Such considerations will be 
                                                                                                                 
Google’s AdSense contextual online advertising service would be anticompetitive. Id. at 1. In a 
4-1 decision, the Commission concluded that the merger was unlikely to have anticompetitive 
effects. Id. 
 101. Id. at 7. Without much explanation, the FTC concluded that Google “is the dominant 
provider of sponsored search advertising,” indicating that the FTC views Google’s search 
engine advertising business as a relevant market and Google’s share at or near the monopoly 
level. Id. at 3. 
 102. Id. at 5–6. 
 103. Id. at 5. 
 104. Id. at 5–6. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Google’s market power in search advertising will not be analyzed due to space 
considerations. The following data may suffice. Google’s share of the search advertising 
market was estimated at 75.9% in 2011, up from 69.8% in 2009. Press Release, eMarketer, 
Google’s Share of Search Ad Revenues Rises, Unaffected by Bing (June 20, 2011), available 
at http://www.emarketer.com/newsroom/index.php/googles-share-search-ad-revenues-rises-
unaffected-bing/. Meanwhile, Bing and Yahoo! have gone from a combined share of 20% 
down to 15.9% in the same period. Id. 
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mentioned when they are relevant in the discussion of anticompetitive conduct 
below. 
3. Geographic Market 
The lack of meaningful geographic borders for Internet-based businesses makes 
defining relevant geographic markets for any web-based business interesting but 
ultimately simple. In the vast majority of cases, limiting the geographic market to 
the United States would be appropriate.107 Unless a particular website is truly local 
in nature,108 there would be no basis for narrowing the market to a particular region 
of the United States because most websites will compete for the entire U.S. market. 
B. Monopoly Power 
While the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, the mere possession of 
monopoly power is not an offense.109 Monopoly power must be “accompanied by 
an element of anticompetitive conduct.”110 A plaintiff must show that the 
anticompetitive conduct caused harm “not just to a single competitor, but to the 
competitive process, i.e., to competition itself.”111 
Monopoly power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”112 To evaluate monopoly power, courts begin with an evaluation of 
the firm’s market share in the relevant market.113 The market share a firm must 
have to be classified as a monopolist is not precisely defined by the case law, but 
70% is a good rule of thumb,114 and to date there have been no cases where a share 
of less than 50% was sufficient.115 While some courts are willing to infer market 
power from market share alone, others require a showing that the market power is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. See, e.g., LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV06-6994AHM(RZx), 2007 
WL 6865852, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (plaintiff chose the United States as the relevant 
geographic market for social networking websites without objection from the defendant 
MySpace). 
 108. One conceivable example would be a plaintiff website that specializes in real estate 
listings for Wichita, Kansas. In that case, the plaintiff would not be competing on a 
nationwide scale, and hence could realistically hope to limit the market to a small area. 
Cases have adopted absurdly narrow geographic market definitions in the past. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo, Making a Market Out of a Mole Hill? Geographic 
Market Definition in Aspen Skiing, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 911, 912 (2010) (noting 
that the market definition before the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), was limited to “‘downhill skiing in the Aspen area’”; the 
Court ultimately found antitrust liability). 
 109. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004). Learned Hand famously wrote that “[t]he successful competitor, having been 
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 110. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (emphasis omitted). 
 111. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998). 
 112. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 113. See, e.g., DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 21. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 21–22. 
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durable.116 The staying power of a monopoly can be shown by demonstrating 
barriers to entry such as patent rights,117 government regulations,118 network 
effects,119 lock-in/switching costs,120 sunk costs (i.e., high entry costs),121 exclusive 
dealing arrangements,122 or insurmountable economies of scale.123 In general, a 
barrier to entry can be defined in one of two partially overlapping ways: (1) as a 
cost that firms already in the market do not have to pay, or (2) as a market structure 
that inherently protects the dominant firm’s market position.124 For purposes of this 
analysis, it will be assumed that the horizontal search market is a relevant market. 
1. Horizontal Search 
Google’s share of the U.S. horizontal search market currently sits on the 
boundaries of monopoly levels in the United States. According to the research firm 
comScore, Google’s share of the U.S. search market was 66.9% in October 2012, 
although other researchers cite figures over 80%.125 The comScore-reported market 
share is a mirror match to the 65% market share that Kodak enjoyed when it was 
found liable for antitrust violations.126 
Assuming that Google has a monopolistic market share (or close to it), the next 
question is whether there are barriers to entry that restrain competitors from 
entering the horizontal search market. There appear to be two primary barriers to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 
§ 3:4 (2012) (collecting cases); see also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 696 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding a firm lacked monopoly power 
because its “ability to charge monopoly prices will necessarily be temporary”); DOJ, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 20 (stating that monopoly power must be 
“much more than merely fleeting”). Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that monopoly power 
should exist for at least five years before it attracts § 2’s attention. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 319 (2d ed. 2002). 
 117. CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 30 
(2011). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Moffat, supra note 15, at 489. 
 120. See id. at 494. 
 121. Alex W. Cannon, Comment, Regulating AdWords: Consumer Protection in a 
Market Where the Commodity Is Speech, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 291, 312 (2009). 
 122. Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 230. 
 123. See id. at 210. For example, “natural monopolies” like electric utilities, have been 
considered to be inherently immune to normal competitive pressures. See generally id. at 
211–12; see also Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C., 311 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing electric utilities as an example of a natural monopoly). 
 124. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 125. Compare Press Release, comScore, comScore Releases October 2012 U.S. Search 
Engine Rankings (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press
_Releases/2012/11/comScore_Releases_October_2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings, with 
StatCounter Global Stats, STATCOUNTER, available at http://gs.statcounter.com/#search_
engine-US-monthly-201209-201211-bar. 
 126. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 
1997) (finding that Kodak controlled 65% “of the markets for photocopier and micrographic 
equipment parts”). 
1574 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1559 
 
entry in horizontal search: network effects and sunk costs. These barriers are 
counterbalanced by the near-zero switching costs in the market for search. 
The most commonly asserted reason for Google’s dominance is indirect network 
effects.127 The argument goes something like this: When users search on Google, 
they provide Google with user data that Google can then utilize to improve its 
search algorithm, thus improving its appeal to consumers; this sequence then 
repeats itself, creating a feedback loop.128 Further, because Google is able to attract 
users with its superior search results, it is then able to attract more advertising 
dollars.129 These advertising dollars fund Google’s continuing efforts to improve its 
search product in a cycle that makes it impossible for rivals to catch up.130 
Argenton and Prüfer have argued that user query logs make monopolization of 
search inevitable.131 User query logs record the user’s behavior on the search 
results page.132 If a user clicks on a link that is not prominently displayed on the 
results, or enters new search terms, it indicates that the results offered by the engine 
were suboptimal.133 The algorithm can then adapt, or be modified, to produce better 
results.134 Because competitors cannot match the dominant search engine’s ability 
to improve its results using query logs, the dominant search engine’s quality gap 
over its competitors continues to increase over time, leading to further 
dominance.135 Thus, the natural trend in search is toward an oligopoly of the search 
engines with sufficient user bases and funding, and the trend ultimately leads to one 
very dominant engine.136 
The search query log argument is not without dispute. Though lacking empirical 
data, Manne and Wright argue that the minimum scale necessary to effectively 
maintain a search algorithm is readily achievable, and that beyond this minimum 
scale the returns from query logs diminish.137 They argue that search engines like 
Bing and Yahoo! already have sufficient scale and therefore are not at a 
competitive disadvantage.138 
This assertion is dubious in light of the DOJ’s investigation of a proposed deal 
between Bing and Yahoo!, in which the DOJ concluded that by combining their 
user query logs the parties would be able to provide more effective search 
results.139 Manne and Wright’s assertion is also dubious because one-sixth of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See, e.g., Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network 
Externalities 1 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2011-024, 2011). 
 128. Id. at 2. 
 129. Id. at 9. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 13. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 9. 
 136. Id. at 9, 11. 
 137. Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 212 (“Based on conversations we have had with 
industry insiders, it appears that algorithmic results are only weakly affected by the number 
of end users or searches.”). 
 138. Id. at 224. 
 139. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid 
Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 
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queries received by Google are new,140 indicating that query logs may play a 
significant role in constantly updating the algorithm, particularly with regard to 
searches for new, rare, and/or obscure terms. In any case, it is true that the 
relationship between user query logs and search engine dominance is unclear to 
academia at this time.141 
It is worth noting that the query logs are perhaps the only barrier to entry in 
search with a close analog in the Microsoft case. In Microsoft, it was found that the 
popularity of Windows encouraged software developers to write applications for 
Windows’ broad audience over less popular operating systems.142 And, because 
consumers wanted an operating system with many applications, a feedback loop 
helped to ensure that Windows would remain dominant.143 Query logs may serve a 
similar function: if query logs substantially affect search result quality, then a non-
dominant search engine would not be able to match the dominant search engine’s 
ability to improve its algorithm simply because the dominant search engine has a 
larger audience. 
Sunk costs in the form of infrastructure investment and initial product 
development represent another barrier to entry in search. Running a search engine 
requires a large investment in the infrastructure necessary to crawl pages, index 
them, and process queries. Crawling the web to index content, when content is 
expanding rapidly, is an enormous task. In 2008, Google had mapped one trillion 
unique URLs, with several billion more pages being added daily.144 Google 
processes this mass of information several times a day.145 The company calls it “the 
computational equivalent of fully exploring every intersection of every road in the 
United States. Except [it would] be a map about 50,000 times as big as the U.S., 
with 50,000 times as many roads and intersections.”146 While a new entrant need 
not have the same resources as Google to compete, the initial investment is 
nonetheless significant. 
The cost of developing a search algorithm is also substantial. Search algorithms 
are closely guarded secrets and in some cases, such as PageRank, key 
developments are patented and unavailable for licensing.147 As such, a successful 
competing search algorithm could take years to develop from scratch and bring to 
market.148 And where novel features of a search engine are not protected by 
                                                                                                                 
2010) (“The transaction will enhance Microsoft’s competitive performance because it will 
have access to a larger set of queries, which should accelerate the automated learning of 
Microsoft's search and paid search algorithms and enhance Microsoft's ability to serve more 
relevant search results and paid search listings, particularly with respect to rare or ‘tail’ 
queries.” (emphasis added)). 
 140. Matt Warman, Google, Caffeine and the Future of Search, TELEGRAPH (June 17, 
2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7833590/Google-Caffeine-
and-the-future-of-search.html. 
 141. See Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 224–27. 
 142. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, We Knew the Web Was Big..., OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG 
(July 25, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra note 27. 
 148. One estimate is that search engine code is about three million lines long and would 
cost up to $100 million dollars to develop. See Rufus Pollock, Is Google the Next Microsoft? 
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intellectual property, a dominant search engine may simply copy those features to 
neutralize innovative competitors.149 
Because the present search model is dependent on advertising dollars, no 
competing search engine is likely to be able to recover its sunk costs without first 
achieving a sufficient user base to attract large advertising revenues. Nor can an 
entrant steal away users by undercutting prices, because search engine services are 
offered for free. This means that market entry is both costly and risky. But two 
countervailing considerations lead to the conclusion that these barriers to entry do 
not insulate a dominant search engine from competitive pressures. 
The first countervailing consideration is switching costs. Users can, and do, 
switch between search engines simply by typing in a URL.150 Admittedly, some 
switching costs do exist. For example, users may be accustomed to optimizing their 
search terms for a search engine’s algorithm, or the search engine may have learned 
to personalize its search results to the user based on the user’s search history. But 
these switching costs are markedly different from those present in cases such as 
Microsoft. In that case, switching would have required users to buy a new operating 
system, and possibly a new computer, in addition to losing their investment on any 
software that was incompatible with the new operating system.151 
The second countervailing consideration is the present and past state of the 
search engine market. Yahoo!, once the dominant search engine, was itself 
displaced by the disruptive entry of Google into the market.152 That is an indication 
of the dynamic nature of the search market. The recent entry of other competitors 
into the market also indicates that while sunk costs are substantial, competitors are 
willing to risk entry. Since 2008, Bing, Blekko, and DuckDuckGo have all 
launched search engines that compete directly with Google.153 At the time of 
writing, comScore’s most recent market share report states that Google’s 
competitors share a third of the market, with Bing-powered search accounting for 
the lion’s share.154 
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Enterprise Institute) (2012). 
 151. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 152. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1182 (2008). 
 153. Bing.com Official Launch Date, BING WATCH . . . JUST BING IT! (June 3, 2009 
12:08 AM), http://www.bingwatch.com/bing-watch/2009/06/bingcom-official-launch-date.html; 
Michael Arrington, Get Ready for Blekko: Public Launch on November 1, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 
26, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/26/get-ready-for-blekko-public-launch-on-november-
1; Miranda Miller, Happy Birthday, DuckDuckGo: Homegrown Search Engine Turns 4, SEARCH 
ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 26, 2012), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2208454/Happy-
Birthday-DuckDuckGo-Homegrown-Search-Engine-Turns-4. 
 154. See supra note 125. 
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The evidence of successful market entry, combined with near-zero switching 
costs, suggests that a court would be, and should be, hesitant to conclude that a 
dominant search engine can maintain its market share by means other than winning 
on the competitive merits. 
2. What’s the Harm? 
Even if a court were to conclude that search dominance is protected by barriers 
to entry, there is a fundamental problem with the conclusion that Google has 
monopoly power: how can Google exclude competition or raise prices in a market 
where users receive the product for free, and where users can switch services by 
simply typing in another URL? 
Google cannot directly exclude competitors from entering the search engine 
market because it has no ability to stop a competitor from going online. Upstart 
search engines like Blekko and Bing have been able to quickly attract new users, 
which suggests that breaking into the search engine market is possible, although 
Blekko is suffering from a lack of resources and Bing is sustaining huge financial 
losses.155 Nor can Google prevent other websites, such as its antagonist Foundem, 
from going online and being discovered through competing search engines, social 
media, or traditional advertising. 
It is also unlikely that Google could begin charging consumers to use its search 
service without suffering an immediate, catastrophic loss of users. It is conceivable 
that, as a dominant player in search, Google could raise advertising prices 
profitably, thereby causing indirect harm to consumers in the form of increased 
prices, without suffering a corresponding loss of its user base. As discussed above, 
increased advertising prices would likely have no discernible effect on Google’s 
consumer base because the increased costs on consumers would be so indirect as to 
be an externality. Whether a dominant search engine is capable of extracting 
monopoly advertising rents would be an empirical question that is complicated by 
the fact that, in Google’s case, advertising prices is auction based. This means that, 
to a large extent, the market is choosing what to pay for AdWords advertising. 
Further, alternative advertising venues, including those of competing search 
engines, may discipline prices. 
Another related problem is whether a dominant search engine would have any 
incentive to compromise the quality of its search results by engaging in search bias. 
In a recent article, Robert Bork and Gregory Sidak argue against there being any 
rational, anticompetitive reason for a dominant search engine to manipulate search 
results.156 Bork and Sidak point out that Google’s competitors, like Bing and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See David Angotti, $30 Million in Funding for Blekko: Blekko Has More Cash to 
Slash the Web, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.searchengine
journal.com/yandex-funds-blekko/34233/ (reporting that Blekko primarily runs off of the 
$54 million in venture capital it has secured since its 2007 launch); David Goldman, 
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2009 launch). 
 156. BORK & SIDAK, supra note 150, at 10–12. 
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Yahoo!, provide specialized search results akin to what one sees on Google—such 
as maps displayed in response to queries for addresses.157 If consumers disliked this 
functionality, a competing search engine could snatch up market share by removing 
it. As users departed from Google, advertisers would follow them.158 Thus, keeping 
this functionality in place would be contrary to Google’s self-interest were it not 
something consumers prefer. Bork and Sidak also point out that under the single-
monopoly-profit theorem, it would likely be irrational for a dominant search engine 
to drive away users with an inferior product in an effort to gain market share in 
other markets.159 Indeed, if a search engine were to harm its product for the sake of 
anticompetitive bias, it would be a strong indication that the search engine is a 
monopoly and is not under competitive pressures.160 
The above problems aside, the rest of the analysis will assume that Google has 
monopoly power in the appropriate relevant markets. In light of Google’s inability 
to exclude competing search engines and its questionable ability to extract 
monopoly prices for its advertising, it is unclear how Google can do anything more 
than hamstring downstream websites by failing to rank them highly. Outside a 
smoking gun case of attempted monopolization, there appear to be only two legal 
theories of anticompetitive conduct that could convert such “hamstringing” into a 
Sherman Act claim. These will now be examined. 
A. Anticompetitive Conduct 
The most prominent theories of anticompetitive conduct premised on search bias 
are the essential facilities doctrine and the monopoly leveraging doctrine. As will 
be shown below, these theories are likely to fail. Additionally, research has 
indicated that Google’s competitors engage in search bias.161 As a general 
proposition, when all competitors in a market engage in a business practice it 
indicates that the practice is not anticompetitive.162 
1. Essential Facilities Doctrine 
One line of argument would be that Google’s search engine is an “essential 
facility,” and that removing a competitor from search results (or demoting the 
competitor so far as to effectively remove him) makes it impossible to compete. 
The essential facilities doctrine is a method of proving the predatory acts necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Id. at 12. 
 158. Id. at 5. 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. Behavior that is only rational where a party is, or expects to become, a monopolist is 
itself evidence that the party is a monopolist. See Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency 
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that predatory pricing behavior 
is only rational if a firm expects to gain or preserve monopoly powers as a result). 
 161. See WRIGHT supra note 58. 
 162. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227 (D.C. Cir. 
1986); see also FTC Google Statement, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that Google’s competitors 
engaged in practices similar to those of Google, which indicated to the FTC that those 
practices were not anticompetitive). 
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to show a § 2 violation.163 The basic premise is that where a facility is essential to 
compete, and a monopolist or near monopolist is in control of the facility, it is 
illegal anticompetitive conduct for the monopolist to deny his competitors access to 
the facility. The doctrine has its roots in the context of railroads. A group of 
railroads combined to control three terminals that constituted all railway bridges 
and switching yards leading into and out of St. Louis, effectively precluding any 
competing railroads from offering service to, or even through, St. Louis.164 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the colluding railroads had to grant access to the 
terminals or the Court would enjoin the defendants from operating the terminals 
collectively.165 
The Seventh Circuit has articulated four elements for proving an essential 
facilities case: “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of 
providing the facility.”166 
A plaintiff complaining of demotion or banishment from Google’s search results 
could probably succeed on the last three prongs. Competitors cannot feasibly 
recreate Google (element two). In an appropriate case, a competitor could allege 
that it was kicked off Google for anticompetitive reasons (element three). Google 
can list competitors at near-zero cost (element four). But proving that Google is 
essential would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Under the more liberal reading of the essential facilities doctrine, which requires 
only a “severe handicap on potential market entrants,”167 the claim is cognizable. 
TripAdvisor, for example, receives 29.48% of its traffic from Google.168 However, 
the cases generally hold that where unilateral conduct is involved, control over 
access to the facility must grant the ability to eliminate competition.169 Websites 
that are excluded by Google may still be ranked highly by competing search 
engines like Bing and Yahoo!. Websites can also promote themselves by 
purchasing advertising or by being linked to from other websites. Moreover, the 
story of Foundem illustrates that Google does not eliminate competitors. In spite of 
Google having a market share of more than 90% in Europe, Foundem (which 
operates in Europe) was still alive and kicking after being de facto banished from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 116, § 3:13. 
 164. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 401 (1912). 
 165. Id. at 412–13. 
 166. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
 167. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 168. Dennis Schaal, TripAdvisor Upstream Traffic—Google Sharply Down, Facebook 
Rising, TNOOZ (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.tnooz.com/2011/01/28/news/tripadvisor-
upstream-traffic-google-sharply-down-facebook-rising. 
 169. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(collecting cases and holding that “[a] facility that is controlled by a single firm will be 
considered ‘essential’ only if control of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate 
competition in the downstream market” (emphasis in original)). 
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Google for three years.170 A district court has already ruled that Google is not an 
essential facility using similar reasoning.171 
The Supreme Court has also thrown a wet blanket on the essential facilities 
doctrine. In Trinko, Justice Scalia wrote that the essential facilities doctrine was 
“crafted by some lower courts” and that the Court had “never recognized such a 
doctrine.”172 The Court noted that Terminal Railroad involved a group of 
competitors colluding, and hence the doctrine had not been approved by the Court 
in cases of unilateral action.173 The Trinko Court declined to rule definitively on the 
validity of the doctrine.174 
2. Monopoly Leveraging 
Monopoly leveraging occurs when a monopolist uses its monopoly power in one 
market to gain a competitive advantage in another market. The doctrine is currently 
on life support, although it has not been expressly abandoned. The Second Circuit 
originally had the most liberal test for monopoly leveraging, requiring “monopoly 
power in one market, ‘the use of [that] power, however lawfully acquired, to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor’ 
in another distinct market, and injury caused by the challenged conduct.”175 The 
Second Circuit later hemmed in the doctrine by stating that “monopoly leveraging 
claims should be limited to instances where the challenged conduct ‘threatens the 
[second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or quality associated with 
the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a large market share.’”176 
In Alaska Airlines, the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected the monopoly leveraging 
doctrine, and held that on such facts a plaintiff must prove a traditional attempted 
monopolization claim.177 The Third and Seventh Circuits have since agreed that 
monopoly leveraging is not an independent offense.178 The Supreme Court seemed 
to favor the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Trinko, although its treatment of the 
doctrine was limited to a footnote.179 The Court’s wording suggests that the Second 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 10. 
 171. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2006 WL 3246596, at 
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 174. Id. at 410. 
 175. Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(citation omitted). 
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 179. “To the extent the Court of Appeals dispensed with a requirement that there be a 
‘dangerous probability of success’ in monopolizing a second market, it erred. In any event, 
leveraging presupposes anticompetitive conduct, which in this case could only be the 
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Circuit’s test is inadequate without the additional element of a dangerous 
probability of successful monopolization, but the Court did not rule that monopoly 
leveraging is an invalid § 2 theory. For example, the Court’s comment leaves open 
the possibility that a showing of specific intent might be unnecessary in a 
monopoly leveraging claim.180 
Google’s conduct would appear to fit neatly within a monopoly leveraging 
theory. By removing competitors from its search results and promoting its own 
products, Google is able to leverage its search engine power to gain a competitive 
advantage in other markets. 
 
Figure 1: Google Product Search U.S. Traffic Before and After Universal 
Search181 
 
In December 2007, when Google began giving Google Product Search 
preference with Universal Search, the effect was immediate, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
The increase in traffic was met with a corresponding loss of traffic to competing 
price comparison websites, and the effect was even greater in the United Kingdom, 
where Google enjoys a larger share of the search market.182 
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Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004) (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
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 182. See RAFF & RAFF, supra note 62. 
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Under the liberal standard of monopoly leveraging, such behavior might be 
enough for a plaintiff to succeed. However, as shown above, the case law now 
questions the validity of the doctrine, and it is likely that a plaintiff would need to 
rely on a traditional attempted monopolization theory to prove an antitrust claim in 
a market that Google has not monopolized. 
Attempted monopolization carries with it the difficulty of proving intent, as well 
as defining other relevant markets and proving a dangerous probability of 
success.183 And again, vertical search services are almost universally offered for 
free. Hence, if a free service cannot be a relevant market, then there could be no 
attempted monopolization claim for such a market. 
3. A Comment on Predatory Algorithm Changes 
Since it is very difficult even for experts to evaluate search engines, 
search engine bias is particularly insidious. . . . For example, a search 
engine could add a small factor to search results from “friendly” 
companies, and subtract a factor from results from competitors. This 
type of bias is very difficult to detect but could still have a significant 
effect on the market. 
 –Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Google Co-Founders184 
As the above quote from the men who created Google suggests, search engine 
bias can be very subtle and difficult to detect, 185 and the current state of antitrust 
law would make any claim based on algorithm manipulation very difficult. As a 
general matter, courts are very wary of ruling on the merits of a company’s product 
development choices.186 The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a design change that 
improves a product will, as a practical matter, insulate a company from § 2 
liability.187 
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For example, in Microsoft, it was found that Microsoft had integrated the code 
for Internet Explorer into critical Windows code, making it virtually impossible to 
remove Internet Explorer from Windows.188 Microsoft had also taken Internet 
Explorer off of the “add/remove” menu, meaning that users could not delete the 
program.189 Because Microsoft offered no procompetitive justification for the 
design changes, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that Microsoft 
had made the design changes for the sole purpose of preserving its monopoly in the 
operating system market.190 
Thus, any claim that Google alters its algorithm in anticompetitive ways could 
be rebutted by Google demonstrating that the design change was a product 
improvement, and courts would tend to give Google the benefit of the doubt. 
Google could offer procompetitive justifications by, for example, showing that the 
design changes improved performance, lowered costs, increased the relevancy of 
search results, or improved the appeal of Google’s product in general.191 In fact, 
this occurred in the FTC’s own investigation of Google’s alleged search bias. The 
FTC noted that Google’s “bias” could be justified as permissible product design 
choices.192 The FTC also emphasized its reticence to “second-guess a firm’s 
product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications have been 
offered, and where those justifications are supported by ample evidence.”193 A 
defense based on product design would not be available if it could be shown that 
Google simply altered its algorithm to quash competition, but at present those facts 
are not in evidence.194 
C. If There Is a Wrong, What’s the Remedy? 
Assuming that an antitrust claim could be proved against a dominant search 
engine, there remains the burning question of what remedy could be imposed—
several potential remedies have been suggested by Google’s critics.195 A recent 
article by Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican summarizes and criticizes each, but 
this Note will focus on only one: search neutrality.196 The rest of the proposed 
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competitors, with no procompetitive justification whatsoever, may be the most persuasive 
fact pattern for an antitrust case. See Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust 
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remedies, such as divesture and regulation of search results page formatting, are 
deeply problematic and should not be pursued. 
Ammori and Pelican make the argument that imposing search neutrality via 
judicial or regulatory means is impossible because “no one has articulated a 
specific formula or metric for determining when or if Google's display opinions 
improperly disadvantage rivals.”197 Other scholars have similarly argued that search 
neutrality is a nonstarter because search results are inherently subjective 
opinions.198 This argument goes too far because there is a simple, four-element 
formula for defining improper search bias. Search bias occurs when (1) a search 
engine manipulates its search results rankings (2) based on the search engine’s 
pecuniary interests in those results (3) without disclosing it is doing so (4) while 
claiming to be providing search results that are based on an unbiased, objective 
measure of relevance. It is easy to define search bias because search bias has 
nothing to do with any reasonable, objective measure of relevance—it has to do 
with the search engine’s proprietary interests. Nor would detecting such bias be 
difficult in all cases. Search engine results are short and most users never look past 
the first page.199 Accordingly, bias is likely to be concentrated in the first few 
results and in areas with the greatest commercial significance—where the 
incentives for bias are greatest. Thus, potential bias is obvious where certain 
websites owned or affiliated with the dominant search engine consistently appear 
near the top of the results, or where competing websites appear lower on the 
dominant engine’s results than on competing search engines, for no apparent 
reason. 
But while search bias can be defined, Ammori and Pelican make several 
separate and compelling arguments about the difficulty of enforcing an antitrust 
decree against search bias. First, positively identifying search bias would likely 
require extensive technical expertise in the computer sciences, and significant time 
and expense might be wasted by monitoring compliance with an outside committee 
of technical experts. A technical committee was implemented in the Microsoft case 
and it has been subjected to much criticism.200 However, concerns about the 
technical difficulty of identifying bias in source code are not without opposing 
considerations. Because each build of a search algorithm would contain largely the 
same source code, the resources required to isolate newly introduced, bias-inducing 
code could be substantially reduced by ignoring the code that remains unchanged 
from prior iterations. 
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Second, monitoring a decree is likely to be very difficult for a generalist judge 
because of the technical matter involved.201 Likewise, the FTC is not focused on 
these sorts of highly technical issues, though presumably the agency would be 
better able to retain a technical staff than a court. 
Third, a decree might encourage competitors to make endless, largely baseless 
claims of search bias each time their rankings drop or Google’s rise.202 This would 
be a resource drain on the court and Google, and it could function as an 
anticompetitive weapon. 
Fourth, and perhaps most persuasively, search rankings could repeatedly change 
in the course of an enforcement proceeding, making an accurate and speedy 
adjudication of all but the most severe instances of search bias impractical or 
impossible as subsequent changes moot alleged harms.203 
D. Takeaways 
From the above discussion, a few conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the 
low switching costs associated with free online services may, as a practical matter, 
insulate the providers of those services from antitrust liability. Low switching costs 
mean that online businesses are always under a competitive threat from new 
entrants. This is not necessarily an undesirable outcome. Indeed, it would be far 
more undesirable to hold a company liable under the Sherman Act when the 
company has merely succeeded in a highly competitive marketplace. 
The second conclusion to be drawn is that current antitrust doctrine tends to 
disfavor the legal theories that would be argued against a dominant search engine 
on the basis of search bias. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the FTC chose to 
close its search bias investigation and forego an antitrust case. But given the 
interest the FTC has shown in pursuing its enforcement agenda recently,204 it is 
probable the FTC will pursue a regulatory agenda where antitrust fails. 
III. REGULATING SEARCH 
For years a debate has raged about regulating search.205 Solutions range from a 
free market approach, to a common law of search, to creating a Federal Search 
Commission.206 This Part briefly examines these proposals and offers its own 
regulatory proposal based on prior regulations and certain existing FTC 
guidelines.207 
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A. Proposals to Regulate Search Bias 
Professor Viva Moffat encapsulates the present debate over regulating search 
nicely. At one end is the atomic bomb solution of a Federal Search Commission.208 
This line of reasoning likens search engines to telecom giants and railroads, which 
are important industries that exhibit network effects tending toward monopoly.209 
Therefore, proponents conclude, regulation is justified.210 But a special agency 
regulating search engines is unnecessary and unwise. Regulatory agencies tend to 
create burdensome, politicized rules and are subject to capture.211 In an innovative 
and fast-moving market like search, such an agency is more likely to stifle 
innovation, to lock in suboptimal technologies, and to favor entrenched interests 
than it is to provide a net benefit to society.212 The Federal Search Commission 
solution smacks of the nirvana fallacy, wherein government regulation cures all ills 
and produces none of its own.213 
The intermediate common law approach to search engine law advocated by 
Professor Moffat214 is likely to be hopelessly unprepared to deal with rapid 
technological advances and unforeseen product development. Indeed, the market 
for search may be so different in a few years that we would no longer think of 
regulating search engines as they are today.215 One can imagine judges struggling 
to apply the doctrine of stare decisis as the facts on the ground quickly undermine 
the rationale of binding precedents.216 
The free market approach postulates that users and advertisers will discipline 
search engines, thus obviating the need for government intervention.217 For 
example, bad publicity from documented search engine bad acting could cause 
users and advertisers to depart en masse.218 The problem with this approach is that, 
as Google’s founders recognized, search engine misconduct is hard to discover. 
Further, a failure to act in the present could lead to more burdensome regulation in 
the future, like the Federal Search Commission, particularly if truly ghastly stories 
of search engine bad acting were to grab widespread headlines. Finally, there is no 
                                                                                                                 
Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search, 
BENEDELMAN.ORG (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias. 
 208. Moffat, supra note 15, at 488. 
 209. See id. at 489. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 492. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1898 (2006) (“Furthermore, any proposed regulatory solution must take 
care to avoid the classic nirvana fallacy: Just because a market-based outcome is suboptimal 
does not mean that a government-imposed outcome will necessarily fare any better.”). 
 214. Moffat, supra note 15, at 499. 
 215. See Robert W. Crandall & Charles L. Jackson, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries, 38 
REV. INDUS. ORG. 319, 324–330 (2011) (recounting cases where DOJ antitrust enforcement 
was preempted by evolving technology). 
 216. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
854–55 (1992) (“[When applying stare decisis,] we may ask . . . whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.”). 
 217. Moffat, supra note 15, at 490. 
 218. Id. at 491. 
2013] gMONOPOLY 1587 
 
such thing as an unregulated market in the United States because antitrust laws 
apply universally.219 The lasseiz-faire approach is, in pragmatic terms, really an 
argument for relying on antitrust enforcement. 
A fourth approach to search bias regulation, raised after Professor Moffat’s 
article, has also received attention and criticism. Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin 
Lockwood have argued for a regulation of search modeled on the regulation of 
airline Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs).220 
In the 1980s, the DOJ conducted an investigation into the practices of CRSs, 
resulting in a variety of agency regulations.221 CRSs provided contracting travel 
agencies with flight information transmitted by carriers via computer networks.222 
Flights would show up on a computer screen as a list of results, much the same way 
that we see search results today, and travel agents could choose a flight from the 
listings and book it electronically.223 The major CRSs were all owned by large 
airlines, with American’s SABRE and United’s Apollo being the leaders.224 The 
claims of anticompetitive conduct brought by the DOJ after its investigation 
resemble those levied against Google today. 
Apollo and SABRE were found to have systematically biased their CRS results 
in favor of their owner-airlines’ flights.225 For example, their algorithms heavily 
weighted factors that were carrier-specific.226 Other examples include inflating the 
flight times of competitors and blocking flights with lower fares.227 CRSs were also 
found to have updated competitors’ flight information at a slower rate.228 This 
practice harmed competition by making competitors’ flight information less 
reliable, by allowing owner-airlines to respond to market prices more effectively, 
and by giving the owner-airlines a temporary window where only their flights 
would appear on the screen.229 A search engine could behave similarly by crawling 
and indexing disfavored websites less frequently. If it did so, those websites would 
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experience a substantial delay before they would appear on the search results. This 
should lead to a feedback effect that further advantages the favored websites. 
Because the favored websites would appear on Google first, people would be more 
likely to discover and link to them. And because PageRank favors sites that receive 
lots of links from other websites, the effect would be self-reinforcing. Websites that 
appear first would be more likely to continue to appear first. 
The history of CRS regulation is both an instructive and cautionary tale. In a 
comprehensive post-mortem of CRS regulations, which were repealed in 2004,230 
Alexander and Lee demonstrate that the goals of CRS regulation were never fully 
achieved, and that repeal was eminently justified.231 They also demonstrate that 
regulation had untoward effects. The agencies intruded excessively into the CRS 
market, which likely hampered innovation.232 Contract terms, the structure of 
display screens, and even algorithmic weighting were regulated by rule.233 None of 
this intrusion was necessary to prevent the primary problem: preventing CRS 
displays from being systematically biased in favor of its owner-airline.234 Instead of 
focusing regulatory efforts on this bias, the agencies became obsessed with drawing 
new entrants into the CRS market—something that never happened. 
Aside from the problematic history of CRS regulations, there are practical 
reasons why the regulations do not apply cleanly to search engines. CRS rankings 
involve relatively few variables, a small number of parties, and a steady number of 
flights based on existing routes.235 This small amount of data makes sifting through 
code and discovering illicit bias a very realistic goal. By contrast, search algorithms 
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continuously seek out and organize billions of web pages, are constantly updated, 
and are of far greater complexity than the ranking systems a CRS probably 
employed. In spite of the problems associated with CRS regulation, one aspect of 
CRS regulation may be the best solution to the general harms caused by search 
bias. 
B. A Broader Solution—Thinking of Undisclosed Bias As a Deceptive Practice 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on dominant search engines’ ability to harm 
competition. But a regulatory solution would apply to search engines generally. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to go back to basics by looking broadly at the 
potential harms accruing to consumers from search engine bias. 
The FTC is empowered to prevent “deceptive acts or practices.”236 Historically, 
the FTC has regarded a false pretense of objectivity as a deceptive practice due to 
its tendency to deceive consumers.237 More generally, a 1983 FTC policy statement 
establishes three elements that “undergird all deception cases”: there must be (1) a 
representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead (2) a reasonable 
consumer, and (3) the misleading act must be “likely to affect the consumer's 
conduct or decision with regard to a product or service.”238 
Undisclosed bias across all search engines, including specialized search 
services, has the potential to meet this definition where the bias is premised on a 
financial interest. To illustrate why, consider Google. A study showed that college 
students were likely to substitute Google search rankings for their own subjective 
rankings of search result relevance.239 Other research has indicated that a majority 
of search engine users are unaware that financial interests may bias search results, 
though an overwhelming majority believe that search engines should disclose this 
information.240 
Undisclosed bias is unlikely to materially injure users when they are searching 
for abstract information like the height of the Empire State Building. Clicking on 
an irrelevant link will merely waste a user’s time. But in the context of price 
comparison websites, the tendency for users to trust in search results could be much 
more pernicious. A user could perceive that the rankings on a price comparison 
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website are an objective ranking of the best products and deals available on the 
web. If the price comparison website ranks its results based on pecuniary concerns, 
or only includes merchants that pay to be listed, consumers may be misled at a cost 
to their wallets. The effect could be similar for location services and travel 
websites. Consumers searching for restaurants, hotels, and flights could be unaware 
that only those businesses that have paid to be included are listed, or that payment 
is a factor in the rankings. These sorts of potential harms are likely the reason that 
Google Shopper presently contains disclosures about its paid inclusion model.241 
The FTC has already exerted some authority over undisclosed bias. In 2002, the 
FTC issued a letter to various search engines regarding paid ranking and paid 
inclusion practices.242 The guidelines contained in the letter advised search engines 
to  
ensure that: (1) any paid ranking search results are distinguished from 
non-paid results with clear and conspicuous disclosures; (2) the use of 
paid inclusion is clearly and conspicuously explained and disclosed; 
and (3) no affirmative statement is made that might mislead consumers 
as to the basis on which a search result is generated.243  
Thus, under the FTC guidelines, any failure to disclose paid inclusion or ranking is 
prohibited. 
The FTC’s existing guidelines have never been formally enforced and observers 
question whether they are being followed.244 Presently, perhaps due to the likely 
failure of an antitrust enforcement action against Google, the FTC is rumored to be 
considering revisions to its guidelines.245 
Certain improvements to the FTC’s existing guidelines could be made so that 
the most pernicious effects of search bias, outlined above, could be mitigated. In 
particular, one rule from the now-defunct CRS regulations could be adapted to the 
present. The rule provided that “[i]n ordering the information contained in an 
integrated display, systems shall not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to 
carrier identity.”246 This rule could be adopted by the FTC and modified along the 
following lines: “In [collecting and] ordering the information contained in [search 
results], [search engines] shall not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to 
[the search engine’s pecuniary interests in those results absent a conspicuous 
disclosure to users].”247 
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This rule would balance several concerns. First, it does not require search 
engines to provide their proprietary search algorithms to private third parties. 
Second, it prohibits only bias that is undisclosed. Thus, search engines could still 
rank the relevance of web content as they please. Third, it prevents search engines 
from misleading consumers by favoring websites in which they have a pecuniary 
interest without full disclosure. Fourth, it includes a provision for “collecting” 
information, which would prevent a search engine from engaging in bias by 
refusing to crawl websites. Fifth, it applies equally to all search engines, whereas 
an antitrust remedy would only affect Google. Sixth, it is not limited to “paid 
inclusion” or “paid ranking” schemes. Accordingly, own-bias by search engines in 
favor of their own products would warrant disclosure. Likewise, other financial 
interests beyond direct payment for rankings would warrant disclosure if they affect 
search rankings. Seventh, the proposed regulation contains no intrusive mandates 
about the format of search results pages or algorithmic formulae, thus alleviating 
concerns about federal command-and-control over product development. 
In spite of the potential for the proposed regulation to target search bias, several 
factors militate against adopting a regulation immediately. First, disclosures like 
those currently present on Google Shopper indicate that major actors are willing to 
make disclosures without being coerced by agency enforcement. Second, the costs 
of regulatory compliance may unnecessarily hamper the growth of newer, smaller 
entrants like Blekko and DuckDuckGo. Third, the potential difficulties associated 
with enforcing a search bias regulation counsel against engaging in a large scale 
enforcement effort without greater certainty as to the feasibility of the 
undertaking.248 Fourth, the history of CRS regulation indicates that enforcement 
agencies may be prone to mission creep and overregulation when regulating bias.249 
Given those considerations, an open dialogue with all interested stakeholders, 
including downstream websites, search engines large and small, computer science 
experts, and consumers is the most likely path to a worthwhile solution.250 
CONCLUSION 
Search bias may facially appear to represent the next big thing in antitrust law. 
However, these fears are likely overstated. Competition exists in the search engine 
market and that competition deters even a dominant search engine from degrading 
its search product with biased results. The zero cost to consumers of switching to a 
competing search engine further disincentivizes bias. Accordingly, it is likely that 
“biased” practices alleged to be anticompetitive today, such as Google’s contextual 
use of Google Maps results in searches, are actually welfare-enhancing integrations 
that consumers prefer. Welfare-enhancing practices should be encouraged, rather 
than discouraged, by antitrust law and regulatory policy in general. 
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Though search bias is a poor fit for antitrust law, the broader problem of 
undisclosed financial interests in search rankings warrants the regulatory scrutiny it 
is receiving. Regulators should look beyond Google and consider the evidence that 
some of Google’s noisiest critics are flouting the existing FTC guidelines to the 
potential detriment of consumers. 
This Note has proposed a regulation that would target the bias that is most likely 
to inflict consumer harm. Nevertheless, in light of myriad concerns associated with 
regulating search bias, regulators should have a full, open, and constructive 
dialogue with both the industry and the public before embarking on a course of 
adversarial enforcement. 
